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As an alternate means of initiating constitutional changes
by a body other than the elected legislative assembly, the
Iowa Constitution of 1857 provides Üiat the voters at the
general election of each year ending in the number "0" shall
have an opportunity to vote on the question, "Shall there be
a convention to revise the Constitution, and amend the same?"
If a majority, of Iowans voting ori this question favor a con-
stitutional convention, then it is supposedly -the duty of the
Iowa General Assembly at its next session to provide the
framework for the convention's operation: means of financing,
basis for selection of delegates, etc.
With two exceptions since the turn of the centviry ( 1920
and 1960), there appears to have been very little interest in
the legislattare's providing for a convention as a means of
initiating constitutional changes. The majority of voters at
the 1920 election actually favored a convention, but statutory
enactments by the legislature during its 1921 session pre-
sumably satisfied the rural interests who had championed Üie
cause of the convention; thus, it was subsequently felt that
no convention was actually necessary. As Table 1 shows, very
few voters in the 1930, 1940 and 1950 elections were particu-
larly interested in a constitutioiial convention, with 42, 36 and
41 per cent, respectively, of those voting on this special issue
favoring it. In addition, only 60, 47 and 63 per cent, respec-
tively, of those who voted for the oflSce of governor voted on
the special issue. However,.as Table 1 also shows, the voters
at the 1960 election demonstrated much interest in utilizing
the convention route to revise the state's Constitution. Besides
a very close election on the special issue, with approximately
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47 per cent in favor and 53 per cent opposed, almost 90
per cent of those who participated in the election voted on
the issue.
Table 1
Votes on the Constitutional Convention
Question, 1910-1960
Year
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
% Voting Yes
45
56
42
36
41
47
% Voting No
55
' 44
58
. ,64
59
53
% Voting"
78 .
59 '
60
47
63
89
"Persons voting on question compared to' those voting for governor.
(Source: Iowa Official Registers, 1910-1960).
The purpose of this essay is to describe the political
situation in Iowa prior to the 1960 vote and to analyze the
vote' on the question of a constitutional convention. As a
point of departure, the dominant political issues within the
state are examined, viáth legislative reapportionment being
foremost among them. Next, the roles played by the major
interest groups in the state, as well as the two political parties,
in the convention question are examined. Finally, an analysis
of the convention vote is undertaken in an attempt to ascertain
the main factors that led citizens to vote either for or against
the holding of a convention.
Political Issues
, The issue that probably generated the greatest political
conflict in Iowa in this century erupted around 1955. This
conflict, generally between rural and urban interests, centered
upon the apportionment of the Iowa Ceneral Assembly. For
approximately 10 years following the end of World War II,
the political conflict over this issue—and a rather low-keyed
conflict it was—^was articulated in .terms of whether or not
there was a need to reapportion the legislature. Rural inter-
ests held that the Legislature for a long time had done an
adequate job of meeting the state's legislative needs and,
therefore, there was no need to change its basis of repre-
sentation. Urban interests, on the other hand, believed that
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many of their demands were not being met by the rural-
oriented body, and that the only way they could obtain
measures- more agreeable to their interests was by increasing
urban representation.
For. decades representation in the Iowa, legislature had
been based on population and area in both houses, with
area having the prédominent influence. The Constitution
originally provided that the Senate and House should be
apportioned on the basis of population. Various other pro-
visions of, and subsequent amendments to, the Constitution,
(along -with the uneven pattern of population growth and
movement within the state) created gross malapportionment
by the 1950s. The House, apportioned heavily on the basis
of area, was composed of one representative from each of
the 99 counties in the state. In addition, each of the nine
most populous counties was permitted an additional repre-
sentative by virtue of a constitutional amendment passed in
1904. Representation in the Senate, although it was supposed
to be based on population, was also heavily weighted accord-
ing to area. A breakdown of these districts according to
population groups is as follows:
Number of districts
4.
14.
25.
6.
Population in districts
263,000
. 100,000-200,000
. .50,000-100,000
...25,000-50,000
. . . Under 25,000
This breakdown demonstrates the population deviations that
existed among senatorial districts. To cite an extreme example,
the senator from the Polk district (Des Moines) represented
an area tiiat had a population of 263,315 persons, while the
senator from the Adams-Taylor district (in the southernmost
part of the state) represented only 17,756 inhabitants. Thus,
urban interests believed they were grossly undenrepresented
in the state legislatiu-e.
Beginning in approximately 1955, both rural and mban
interests were agreed that some form of reapportionment was
necessary. Both also believed that the constitutional amend-
ment process would have to be used to base representation in
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at least one of the two legislative houses on population. "ITie
conflict over reapportionment after 1955 was articulated in
terms of which house should be based on population and
which on area. Rural interests took the position that the House
of Representatives should be apportioned according to area,
with one representative being elected from each county.
Their position was generally argued in terms of the absolute
protection of minority, or, in this case, rural representation
and rights. Urban interests, on the other hand, argued that
if only one house were to be apportioned on the basis of
population, it should be the House of Representatives, in
accordance with the Federal structure.
Numerous proposals were presented by both sides dining
the 1955, 1957 and 1959 sessions of the General Assembly. All,
foi- one reason or another, were defeated. Although party
politics within the legislature played an important role in
this matter. Table 2 demonstrates the rural-urban cleavage
that also characterized the lawmaking body on this issue.
Urban Democrats and Republicans joined together in favor-
ing a plan that would have based representation on popula-
tion in the House and on area in the Senate.
The Legislatiu-e ended its 1959 session without passing
any redistricting plan. Urban interests were quick to point
this out, claiming at the same time that the rural-dominated
Legislature would not and probably could not pass reappor-
tionment in behalf of urban interests. Therefore, they advo-
cated that the issue could only be resolved by taking it out
of the Legislature and placing it in the hands of a constitu-
tional convention. Rural interests charged the urbanités wàth
being obstructionists and claimed that a fair plan satisfying
aU interests concerned would be approved by the 1961
session of the Legislature; therefore, there was no need for
a constitutional convention.
Table 2
Population
of counties
40,000 or more
20,000-40,000
Less than 20,000
Democrats
Yes
18
3
3
24
No
0
4
20
24
Republicans
Yes
5
5
6
16
No
1
9
33
43
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Another of the major issues debated in the Iowa Legis-
lature in the 1950s centered upon the official state pohcy
regulating the purchase and distribution of liquor. This pohcy
had been established in 1934, shortly after the people voted
to end prohibition. Under the new policy, the state govern-
ment had the responsibility for the purchase and distribution
of all "hard" hquors. The sale of liquor-by-the-drink, or
"across-the-bar," was prohibited. To legally acquire any liquor
within the state, one had to purchase it at a state-operated
liquor store. Beer usually could be acquired in "normal"
retail outlets such as taverns and grocery stores.
Judging by the behavior exhibited by members of the
State Legislature in the 1950s, it becomes evident that persons
desiring a more "liberal" state liquor policy had grown more
numerous and vocal. For example, in 1949 a bill was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives by seven rural "dry"
legislators. The bñl, in efiFect, would have permitted coimties
on a local - (county) option basis to have complete prohibi-
tion with respect to beer and liquors. The biU narrowly
escaped being enacted into law by a 50-57 vote margin.' Ten
years later (1959) the House considered a biU that would
have permitted the sale of liquor-by-the-drink on a local -
(county) option basis. Although the proposal was soundly
defeated, 35-72, an analysis of the roll call vote (see Table 3)
Table 3
Liquor-By-The-Drink Roll Call Vote
House of Representatives—1959
Population
of counties
40,000 or more
20,000-40,000
Less than 20,000
Democrats
Yes
16
3
5
24
No
1
5
17
23
1 Republicans
Yes
5
3
3
11
No
1
15
33
49
Tlie 72 legislators who voted against this bill represented counties
with 49.2% of the Iowa population, while the 35 who voted in favor
of it represented counties with 50.8% of the population.
^Journal of the House, 58th General Assembly. Des Moines: State
of Iowa, 1959.
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demonstrates that the division of legislators was predominant-
ly along rural-urban lines. Cenerally, legislators representing
urban constituencies, regardless of their party affiliations,
voted in favor of the legalization of Uquor-by-the-drink in
those counties where voters approved such a plan in a local
referendum, whue legislators representing rural constituencies,
regardless of party affiliation, voted against i t
The demand for liquor-by-the-drkik as essentially an
urban phenomenon was accentuated by two factors. First, six
of the 11 most populous cities of Iowa are located on the
borders of the state, next to cities or towns of other states
which have Hquor-by-the-drink. Business interests in these
cities believed that they lost much revenue directly or
indirectly by residents crossing the border into the adjacent
states to purchase their liquor "across-the-bar." Second, there
occurred in Iowa during the 1950s a large increase in the
number of key clubs, private clnbs in which an individual by
the payment of a usually nominal fee could become a mem-
ber and enjoy whatever privileges or advantages that accom-
panied having his liquor served "across-the-bar." In Polk
County (Des Moines), for example, there were over 100 key
clubs by 1960, of which only a few were considered to be
"legitimate" private clubs—fratemal organizations, service
clubs, country clubs, etc. (Club members had to consume
their own liquor—that which they had originally purchased
in a state liquor store—in order for the club to be con-
sidered legitimate.) Urban law enforeement officials found it
difficult to regulate the operations of these clubs. The State
Legislature, reluctant to pass laws that might jeoparidise the
legitimate fratemal and service clubs, maintained a hands-off
attitude toward measures that had as their objective more
stringent regulation of the so-called "phony" key clubs. The
presence of these two factors—^business losses as perceived
by border city interests and the growth of allegedly un-
regulated "illegitimate" key clnbs—provided "wet" interests
within the state with ammunition to fight for a more "liberal"
state policy.
Another political issue of the 1950s associated with the
1960 constitutional convention question focused upon the
division of state road money to Üie state's three major road
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systems: primary, secondary, and cities and towns. Rural
interests generally opposed any reduction in state expendi-
tures going to secondary roads, while urban interests, espec-
ially toward the latter part of the 1950s, demanded a sub-
stantial increase in appropriations for roads and streets in
cities and towns, usually at the expense of the secondary road
fund. Basic to the problem of flnancing Iowa road construc-
tion and maintenance is the fact that the state has more
miles of road in relation to the number of inhabitants and
the nvunber of square miles than any other state.
The state intiated its highway, road and street modernizar
tion program in 1949 when the 53rd General Assembly estab-
lished the state road-use tax fund. "The fanner needs to get
out of the mud" was the often heard campaign slogan of
the rural interests. The State Legislature, in setting up the
fund, decided that the primary road system should receive
42 per cent of the money allocated from the fund; the secon-
dary road system, 50 per cent; and municipalities, 8 per cent.
With the exception of a few grumblings in the urban press,
there appeared to be very little conflict over these initial
percentage allocations.
Major changes in the allocation of state road money were
made in 1953 and 1955 when, in each year, the Legislature
increased on a "temporary" basis the state gasoline tax by
one cent. This two-cent increase, which later became perman-
ent, was earmarked for the primary road system. Thus, in
1956, including this two-cent increase, the percentage alloca-
tions of state road money to the various road systems were 51
per cent to primary roads, 42 per cent to secondary roads and
7 per cent to municipal roads and streets.
Before and during the 1959 session of the legislature,
urban interests increased their demands for a "fairer" dis-
tribution of state road money. About this time, the urban
press began employing the slogan, "city people need to get
out of the mud, too," as an obvious reply to the rural interests
who opposed any increase in the allocation of road money to
mimicipalities—at the expense of the secondary roads. A bill
was introduced in the General Assembly which, if it had
been enacted into law, would have increased the portion of
the road-use tax fund allocated to cities and towns from
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eight to 14 per cent (excluding the two-cent special gasoline
tax earmarked for primary roads). The proposed 6 per cent
increase was to come from a corresponding decrease in the
allocation to the secondary road system. The Legislature, as
a "temporary" measure, passed an amended version of the
bill which provided for a 2 per cent "off-the-top" (before
the regular formula was applied) appropriation from the
road-use tax fund to cities and towns for an 18-month period.
At the same time, it provided for the establishment of a
Road Study Committee, composed of legislators and interested
non-legislators, to study the road situation and make recom-
mendations to it in 1961. The urbanités fell short of their 14
per cent goal and were quite unhappy about their inability
to obtain more favorable treatment with respect to state
road financing policy from the rural-oriented Legislature.
Another political issue of the 1950s that can be associated
with the 1960 constitutional convention question concerned
the official state policy dealing with labor organizations. For
more than a decade, organized labor viewed with general
disfavor the laws regarding its organizational activities. Two
laws, one dealing with labor union membership and the
other with strikes, were passed by the Ceneral Assembly in
1947. The first, the so-called right-to-work law, made it
vuilawful to discriminate in the employment of any person
because of membership or non-membership in a labor union,
or to require any person to pay dues to a union as a condition
of employment. The law, in effect, outlawed the union shop.
Organized labor considered it even more restrictive than
usual in that it prohibited any employer from deducting
labor union dues from an employe's pay check unless auth-
orized by the employe. Furthermore, such an authorization
had to be countersigned by the employe's spouse, if he or
she were married. The second law passed by the Legislature
in 1947 was designed to curtail labor boycotts and strikes.
The law made it illegal for a labor union to enter into any
conspiracy or contract by strikes, or the threat of strikes, for
the purpose of forcing any employer into any agreement.
Voting patterns in the State Legislature during the 1950s
on bills tiiat would have repealed the right-to-work law and
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other laws considered to be restrictive by organized labor
generally demonstrated both a partisan and rural-urban cleav-
age. This rural-urban conflict was stimulated by those groups
interested in maintaining the status quo with respect to labor
policies. Manufacturers, businessmen and a large proportion
of the rural political community were aligned on this issue.
On the other hand, those groups which favored the repeal of
these labor policies were found only in the urban areas of
the state.
A number of other governmental reform issues had been
discussed and debated during the 1950s which were associated
with the 1960 vote on the constitutional convention. In fact,
most proponents of the convention pointed out that such
needed reforms could easily be proposed by a convention.
Most notable among the proposals were those for county
government consolidation, a shorter ballot for state elective
officials, annual sessions of the State Legislature and an
increase of the state debt limit.
Proposals to change the county governmental structure
usuaUy had as a central theme the consolidation of the 99-
county structure into fewer such units of local government.
Glaiming that consolidation would result in more efficient
local government, the proponents of such proposals were
mainly urban interests, including the urban press. Opposition
to such proposals was generally rural-centered, with farmers'
groups, county elected officials and the rural press leading
the way.
Another issue of structure reform that had overtones of
the rural-urban conflict concerned the proper method of
selecting state officials. Iowa's top executive and adminis-
trative officials—governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general and secretary of
agricultural—had traditionally obtained their offices via popu-
lar election. Most proposals to "modernize" the executive
branch of the state government contained provisions which
would make all executive and/or administrative positions
appointive, except for the top two; the governor and lieu-
tenant governor. Following the cabinet structure of the
national government, the proponents of such plans generally
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agreed that the power of the govemor within the political
arena should and would be enhanced by permitting him to
select his own top administrative officials. Generally, sentiment
in favor of such proposals centered in the urban press and
at colleges and universities. These same groups were the
chief advocates of such reform measures as annual sessions
of the legislature, increasing the state debt limit, etc.
Interest Groups
Groups allied in favor of a constitutional convention in
1960 included the urban press, organized labor, the League
of Women Voters, municipal officials of larger lu-ban areas,
college and university academicians and an ad hoc group,
the Citizens Committee for a Constitutional Convention. The
issue of reapportionment was probably the most salient factor
in binding these groups together. Generally urban-centered,
these groups felt that the rural dominated legislature would
never pass a reapportionment plan acceptable to their in-
terests. Members of this larger reformist grouping in the con-
vention controversy had attempted in the 1950s to change a
number of the previously discussed state policies, policies
which they considered detrimental to their more specific
interests. The role of each one of the interest groups which
comprised the reformist interest grouping wül be briefly
examined.
Probably the most influential and certainly the most out-
spoken proponent of a favorable vote on the constitutional
convention was the urban press. This group was composed
mainly of the dailies of the largest cities in the state: The
Des Moines Register and Tribune, Cedar Rapids Gazette,
Waterloo Daily Courier, Davenport Morning Democrat and
the Burlington Hawk-Eye Gazette. There was only one major
urban dauy that opposed the calling of a constitutional con-
vention: the Coun:cil Blufs Nonpariel. The NonparieVs posi-
tion on the convention was consistent with the generally anti-
reformist posture it assumed on other controversial issues
debated in the Iowa Legislature during the 1950s.
Of the urban newspapers The Des Moines Register and
Tribune, because of their large state-wdde circulation and
enthusiasm for many reform measures, were the most potent
advocates of the 1960 convention. During the 1950s, these
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papers had championed such measures as legislative reappor-
tionment, cotmty government consolidation and reform, "home
rule" for urban areas, a shorter ballot and annual sessions of
the legislature. The Register and Trihune urged dieir readers
editorially on many occasions prior to the election to vote
"yes" on the convention question. In addition, they emphasized
via the political cartoon, the "backwardness" of the Iowa
Legislature, while at the same time extolling the "virtues"
of the constitutional convention as a means of initiating what
were eonsidered as overdue structural changes v^dthin the
state's political system.
The Iowa Federation of Labor (IFL), an affiliate of
AFL-CIO, also supported the calling of a constitutional con-
vention. In 1960, 85,000 workers residing in the more urban-
ized areas of the state belonged to this group. The group's
total expenditures for all of its various activities was ap-
proximately $100,000. The involvement of organized labor
in the convention issue was based on its. desire for legislative
reapportionment and the abohshment of the state's right-to-
work law. Labor representatives felt that the latter could
be achieved only with the "true" accomplishment of the
former. As the vice president of the IFL stated at the time:
No matter how hard the labor movement might work, no
possible way could be found to elect enough representatives
under the current apportionment with a liberal attitude toward
labor to make possible the repeal of the Iowa right-to-work
law, or to gain proper, up-to-date, and fair laws on unem-
ployment compensation, workmens compensation, minimum
wages, or any of the other laws common to the east or far
west . . . Of the 99 counties, there are major concentrations
of unions in only 15 or 16, and 50 of them have virtually
no union membership at all.^
The Iowa League of Women Voters (ILWF) also form-
ally supported the constitutional convention. In 1960 this
group had a total membership of some 1,800 women and a
total budget of approximately $7,600. Like the IFL, a fairly
large proportion of the League's membership was located in
the more urbanized areas of the state. As in most other states,
this women's group has traditionally assumed a reformist
^Dale, Vernon, Personal Correspondence. Des Moines: Iowa Fed-
eration of Labor, Oct. 17, 1960.
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posture on a number of public policy questions. The position
of the Iowa League on the constitutional convention was
consistent with its previous positions on legislative reappor-
tionment, a shorter ballot and annual sessions of the legis-
lature.
Generally, municipal offiicials of Iowa's major irrban areas
also were members of the reformist interest grouping. Their
interest in a convention was based on the belief that the
State Legislature was not responsive to many of their policy
demands of the 1950s. The problems faced by such officials
in controlling "illegitimate" key clubs has been referred to
earlier. Many municipal officials blamed a good nvunber of
their financial and administrative problems on the legislature's
failure to provide "home rule" for any of its urban areas.
This group believed that a convention could initiate a con-
stitutional "home rule" amendment, in addition to providing
a reapportionment plan more acceptable to their interest.
The state organization of municipal officials, the Iowa
League of Municipalities (ILM), took no formal position on
the convention question. This was due partly to the fact that
a substantial proportion of its members were mimicipal of-
ficials of essentially rural, conservative towns. Probably even
more important was the reluctance of the organization's lead-
ership to take a stand on the convention; taking a pro-con-
vention stand would risk angering the rural-dominated legis-
lature and might possibly endanger the League's future pro-
posals. As the executive-director of the League stated before
the 1960 election:
Municipalities are dependent on the good wishes and coopera-
tion of the state legislature for their survival. The state legis-
lature decides what municipalities may do and not do, what
acts they may not perform and those that they may, what
taxes they may levy and what taxes they may not levy. Hence,
since the state legislature is the master of the municipality
— so to speak — and since tlie league is the only instrument
that municipalities have to plead their cause before the state
legislature, it would be unwise indeed for the league to par-
ticipate in any highly controversial matter in which the wel-
fare of municipalities is not clearly at stake, and thus incurring
the ill wall of some members of the legislature.^
^See the Iowa Business Digest. Iowa City: State University of
Iowa, Summer 1960.
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The municipal officials of the larger urban areas in the state
who advocated the calling of a constitutional convention did
so, therefore, on an individual basis and not through their
state-wide organization. (Since the 1960 election, the League
has undergone a major reorganization in terms of both per-
sonnel and approach. )
College and university academicians, although not for-
mally organized, also tended to favor a constitutional conven-
tion. The interest of this group in a convention had its
moorings in the general "liberal" disposition usually displayed
by many members of the college and university community
on many political issues. Another factor influenced academic
opinion. The Iowa Constitution of 1857 provided that at no
time could the state's bonded indebtedness exceed $250,000.
Some academicians felt that the educational facilities at
the state supported universities were either inadequate or
quickly approaching such a status. To many, the constitu-
tionally imposed debt maximum served as a barrier to a
possible rapid means of obtaining a substantial amount of
capital to make major improvements in educational facilities
at the state institutions. Thus, academicians tended to support
a convention not only because of their general "Uberal" pre-
disposition, but also because they considered the convention
a means of removing what they considered an "unrealistic"
maximum indebtedness figure.
Several months before the 1960 general election, the pro-
ponents of the convention organized an ad hoc citizens'
group to promote on a wide-scale basis a favorable conven-
tion vote. Knovra formally as the Non-partisan Citizens Com-
mittee for a Constitutional Convention, most officers of this
group were officers or prominent leaders of the interest
groups that comprised the reformist grouping. For example,
the vice president of the IFL, the president of CrinneU
CoUege, the executive director of the (State University of)
Iowa Almnni Association, the publisher-editor of the Iowan
magazine and a few leaders of the ILWV served on the
Committee's board of directors.
Many groups although formally neutral on the convention
question, were informally opposed to the convention. This
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was especially true with respect to a number of groups that
had vested interest in preserving the status quo of official
state governmental policy. To favor any changes via the
convention route would present these groups with certain
risks. In the end, if the convention received a favorable vote,
it might have lDeen too great a risk, especially if some state
policies currently in effect and favorable to their more
specific interests were altered in any way.
In formal opposition to a constitutional convention were
the following three interest groups: the Iowa Farm Bureau
Federation (IFBF), the Iowa Manufacturers Association
(IMA) and the rural press. Although the number of groups
that opposed the convention is obviously less than the
number that supported it, the actual strength of those op-
posing the convention was great. Taken individually or col-
lectively, the IFBF, the IMA and the rural press had tra-
ditionally been quite powerful in Iowa politics.
Active in the campaign period prior to the election, the
IFBF formally announced its opposition to the convention.
The IFBF was generally regarded as the most powerful
interest group at the time. The least the IFBF was able to
do, iF it could not obtain the legislation it wanted, was to
block the passage of any legislative proposal considered
detrimental to its interests. The power of this group resulted
from several factors: membership, financial resources, or-
ganization and communication, leadership and legislative
access. Two of these with special significance were the group's
membership and financial strength. For example, in 1960 the
IFBF had approximately 120,000 members and spent a total
of approximately $600,000 for its various state activities. It
ranked considerably ahead of any other interest group within
the state with regard to these two indicies of power.
During the 1950s the IFBF generally opposed, in whole
or in part, a number of the programs or policies advocated
by the reformist groups. For example, it successfully opposed
measures that would have increased substantially the amount
of state road money going to the municipal streets and high-
ways at the expense of the secondary road system. It also
successfully opposed a shorter ballot and other measures
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that would have led to major county consolidations and
reforms. Together with the IMA, it opposed the attempts by
organized labor to repeal the right-to-work law. In addition, it
successfully opposed the attempts of urban interests to obtain
a state-wide dayhght savings time law, and legislation which
would have permitted cities to levy a sales tax. The opposi-
tion of the IFBF to the calling of a constitutional conven-
tion in 1960 was consistent with its general legislative activi-
ties during the 1950s.
It would be unfair and inacciurate to state that the IFBF
actually opposed legislative reapportionment during the
latter part of the 1950s. Under the pressure of urban forces
during the flrst part of the 1950s, the IFBF did actually draft
and propose a reapportionment plan around 1955. However,
the proposed constitutional amendment, which eventually
beeame knoviTi as the "Sha£E Plan," faued to pass the Iowa
Senate diniig either the 1957 or 1959 sessions of the General
Assembly. The main opposition to the amendment came
from a coahtion of Democrats and urban Repubheans.
The IFBF claimed, for both intemal and external pro-
paganda purposes, that the State Legislature was best
equipped to handle the reapportionment problem. The IFBF
achieved much notoriety, especially in the urban press, for
the placards that many of its members placed on the door-
knobs of both rural and urban homes during the campaign.
Aligned with the IFBF in opposition to the convention
was the IMA. In 1960 this group was composed of approxi-
mately 520 business and industrial estabhshments and ex-
pended around $80,000 for aU of its activities.
Another traditionally influential group, the Association
opposed a number of proposals advocated by the reformists
during the 1950s. Among these were opposition to the fol-
lowing suggested governmental reforms : ( 1 ) a shorter ballot
for popularly elected state officials, (2) annual sessions of
the legislature and (3) an increase in the debt hmitation
imposed upon both the state and local levels of government by
the Iowa Constitution. In addition, the IMA strongly opposed
any change in the state's right-to-work law. Since organized
labor actively supported the convention in 1960, it was not
186 ANNALS OF IOWA
at all unusual to find the IMA on the side of the conven-
tion's opponents on this issue.
The campaign period prior to the election also found the
rural press generally on the side of the constitutional con-
vention's opponents. In aecordance with its general anti-
reformist disposition, the rural press opposed many of the
changes advocated by the reformists during the 1950s. For
example, this group looked with general disfavor upon the
proposals which would have had the efiîect of granting urban
areas more "home rule" authority. Opposition to many state
governmental reforms—a, shorter baUot, annual sessions of
the legislature, etc.—were generally voiced in the small town
press also. The anti-reformist posture of this group stemmed
at least partly from the fact that its members tended to reflect
the interests of conservative, rural,, small town businessmen,
who, to a large degree, were economically dependent upon the
patronage of farmers residing within their neighboring com-
munities.
Like its urban counterpart, the rural press was, on many
~ occasions, editorially quite outspoken on the convention
issue. It also used the political cartoon, emphasizing the like-
lihood that a constitutional convention would function as
some type of monster, tearing apart every "sacred" provision
of the Iowa Constitution and changing certain desirable
public policies currently in effect.
Several months prior to the 1960 election, the opponents
of a constitutional convention also formed an ad hoc citizens'
group, Iowans for Reapportionment By Legislative Action
(IRLA). Comparable to the Citizens Committee for a Con-
stitutional Convention, this special group was designed to
appeal to a broader public than the above mentioned three
groups could. Prominent members of the board of directors
and original incorporators of the IRLA included the pub-
lishers of rural newspapers, manufacturers and former leaders
of county Farm Rureau organizations. In addition, a number
of prominent bankers and former legislators served on the
board of directors or were original incorporators of this
group.
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Political Parties
The 1960 state Democratic platform was very explicit in its
endorsement of a favorable vote on the constitutional con-
vention. The platform stated:
The Democratic Party of Iowa believes that aU citizens of
the state of Iowa are entitled to fair and equitable represen-
tation in the legislative branch of the government.
We further believe that citizens of the state of Iowa are
entitled to other governmental reforms including the adoption
of the short ballot for the state of Iowa; the adoption of four
year terms for the State Officers; and governmental reorgan-
ization.- All of these governmental reforms require changes in
the Iowa Constitution.
We therefore support the holding of a Constitutional Conven-
tion and urge the citizens of Iowa vote YES on the question
to hold a convention to amend and revise the Constitution.''
The Republican party platform, on the other hand, was
ambivalent toward the convention question. In essence, the
RepubHcan platform suggested to the voter to make up his
or her own mind on this issue. It formally stated:
The question of whether the citizens of Iowa should vote in
favor of or against the holding of a Constitutional Convention
is not in the usual sense a partisan political issue. But we feel
this is a question of major public interest in this decennial
year of 1960.
The pros and cons of this question are being vigorously and
ably advanced and debated by a number of responsible groups
and organizations, some of whom favor the holding of a Con-
stitutional Convention and some whom [sic] oppose it. We
therefore, urge each of the citizens of this state to carefully
consider the arguments advanced on both sides of this issue
and to cast an informed vote in that way which they [sic]
believe will be in the best interests of Üie State of Iowa.°
Generally, the formal pronouncements of the major parties
on the convention question reflected their bases of support.
The Democratic party got its most consistent support from
the larger urbanized areas of the state. The Republican party,
on the other hand, relied upon both rural and urban residents
for its support. Delegates from urban areas had much in-
fluence at state Democratic conventions, while delegates from
"The 1960 State Platform and Candidates of the Democratic Party
of Iowa. Des Moines: The Democratic State Central Committee of Iowa,
1960.
''The 1960 Republican State Platform. Des Moines: Republican
State Headquarters, 1960.
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both rural and urban areas exercised varying degrees of
influence at Republican conventions.
The 1960 gubernatorial candidates of the major parties
took positions on the constitutional convention that were
similar to their respective party platforms. Edward J. Mc-
Manus, the Democratic candidate, favored calling a conven-
tion and actively urged Iowans to vote "yes" on the question
at the November election. Norman A. Erbe, the Republican
candidate, held that the legislature would approve a reappor-
tionment proposal at its next session regardles of the vote
on the convention. He stated publicly tiiat he thought he
"might" personally vote for a convention.®
The Constitutional Convention Vote'
, The results of the convention vote demonstrated the wide-
spread interest of the electorate. Of the 1,273,820 Iowans who
yoted in the 1960 presidential election, 1,002,796 (about 80
per cent) voted either "yes" or "no" on the convention ques-
tion. Of those who voted for either gubernatorial candidate
approximately 90 per cent also voted on the convention
question.
The majority of those voting on the question voted
agaiiist the calling of a constitutional convention; 400,034
( approximiately 47 per cent) favored a convention and 532,762
(approximately 53 per cent) opposed it. The proportion favor-
ing the convention tended to vary a great deal from one
geographical area of the state to another. For example, the
percentage of "yes" votes varied from a high of 81 per cent
in Polk County (Des Moines) to a low of 11 per cent in Ida
County in northwest Iowa. The convention received a major-
ity of favorable votes in 16 counties; these 16 ranked among
the top 18 Iowa counties in population according to the
1960 census. Voters in counties located in extreme southern
and northwestern Iowa cast a substantial proportion of their
votes against the convention proposal. This negative response
cannot be attributed merely to geography, given the current
«See The Des Moines Tribune, Oct. 4, 1960.
'The author has undertaken a rather extensive statistical analysis
of the constitutional convention vote. However, only a general summary
of his findings is reported here.
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variance in residential patterns throughout the state. What
generally marks these two areas off from other areas in the
state is the fact that few urban areas of any substantial size
are situated within them.
Table 4 shows that persons in urban counties voted in
higher proportions in favor of the convention, while persons
in rural counties voted in larger proportions against the con-
vention proposal. The urban versus rural residency factor
seems to have been the most important determinant of voting
on the question. Generally, urban residents favored the calling
of a convention, while rural residents opposed it.
It should be added that other factors were probably also
important determinants of voting on this question, although
undoubtedly less so than rural or urban residence. Voters in
coimties with a large percentage of persons employed in
manufacturing voted in higher proportions for the convention,
while those in counties with a smaller percentage of persons
employed in manufacturing voted against it. This finding is
consistent with the previous description of the position taken
by organized labor in the convention controversy.
In addition, voters in counties having populations with
high average incomes and educational attainment levels cast
their votes in larger proportions for the convention than did
voters in counties with persons having low incomes and edu-
cational attainment levels. This relationship existed even
when coniparing counties with high percentages of urban and
rural residents.
No significant relationship existed between the vote for
governor and the vote on the convention, even though the
parties and their candidates took different positions on the
convention question. In other words, persons who cast their
votes for governor did not vote alike to any signfficant degree
on the convention question. Presumably, the casting of ballots
for governor and the convention were two separate, or dis-
tinct, actions on the part of many voters.
Table four appears on page 190.
190 ANNALS OF IOWA
Table 4
How Urban, Mixed and Rural Counties
Voted on the Convention Question
Counties
Classified"
Number of Counties Whose Voters Favored
the Convention by the Following Percentages
Urban
Mixed
Rural
Under 31%
0
13
44
(57)
31-60%
7
20
6
(33)
Over 60%
8
1
0
(9)
(15)
(34)
(50)
(99)
"Classification of counties into urban, mixed and rural groups is
based on the percentage of each county's population residing in
urban areas of 2,500 or more according to the 1960 census. Urban
counties have over 60%, mixed counties between 31% and 60% and
rural counties under 31% of their populations residing in urban areas.
MARKERS FOR REMEMBRANCE:
THE MORMON TRAIL
by Lida I. Greene
Librarian, State Historical Library
Some months ago a lost marker was brought to the Iowa
Historical Museum. It was wooden, the carving weathered
and a little forlorn. It looked as though it had been hiding
in a fence comer for a dozen hard Iowa winters. The legend
read, "Mormon Trail".
In the years of the Civilian Conservation Corps in Iowa,
1933-1940, a whole platoon of these signs had marched across
the old Trace in southern counties. Roy Chastain of Des
Moines, then employee of the Iowa Conservation Commission,
has good reason to remember both the Trail and the markers.
He covered much of the ground between Montrose and Coun-
cil Bluffs, helping to locate probable camp sites of the migrat-
ing Latter Day Saints and overseeing the planting of the
signs that were to be a memorial of the great hegira ( 1846-
1852).
Several years ago Roy Chastain brought to the Department
of History the plat maps of Iowa counties he had used in the
1930s to mark the route of the Saints. Lee County to Pottawat-
tamie, the trau was traced in red with dates and notations

